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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS AND OUTLINE
OF HYPOTHETICAL PROBLEM
John S. Lowe*
The purpose of this showcase program is to illustrate and perhaps
educate as well as to some of the issues that are presented by changes
that are taking place in the natural gas industry. The topic is contract
issues in the natural gas industry, but in point of fact, we're going to
be talking about a number of policy issues as well. This program is
cosponsored by the Administrative Law Section and the Public Utility
Law Section as well as the Natural Resources Law Section, primarily
because lawyers from all of those sections are intimately involved with
these kinds of problems.
When I was approached to work with this group on this project, I
was just getting ready for final examinations at Southern Methodist
University where I was a visiting professor, and perhaps as a result of
my mind set at that point in time, the problem that we're using as a
discussion focus today may remind many of you of the kind of problems that you saw on examinations in law school. It is also similar to
those kinds of problems in that there is not any real answer to it; certainly, I am not in a position to provide any answers. I inviteyou,
however, to review the problem with me prior to the discussion by our
panel of experts.
The central fact of our discussion problems and the central fact of
what is happening in real life in the gas industry is that there has been
a substantial decline in demand for natural gas at the burner tip. Because
of energy conservation, severe recession and competition from other
fuels, total demand for natural gas in the United States fell from more
than 20 trillion cubic feet in 1979 to slightly more than 17 trillion cubic
feet in 1983. In just four years, total demand for natural gas at the burner
tip fell approximately 16 percent.
The falloff of demand was even more dramatic in the industrial and
utility sectors, which generally use about 50 percent of natural gas in
the United States or 50 percent of that consumed, and which are much
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more susceptible to switching to alternate fuels when, as has happened
recently, the price of natural gas goes up vis-a-vis the price of alternative
fuels, such as oil. In that same period of time, from 1979 to 1983, there
was a decline in use of gas in the combined industrial and utility sectors of from 11 trillion cubic feet to a 8-1/2 trillion cubic feet. That was
a falloff of 22-1/2 percent in just a four-year period.
Over that same period, from 1979 to 1983, the deliverability of natural
gas in this country, that is the amount of gas that could be produced
in a single time period, remained about the same. The result has been
a substantial gas surplus estimated by the Department of Energy at from
3 to 5 trillion cubic feet in 1983. It is estimated to be from I to 3 trillion
cubic feet in 1984. Thus, we are talking about a percentage surplus of
deliverability at the present time of between 10 and 25 percent.
The decline in demand has adversely affected every one of the parties in our discussion problem and to use a phrase coined as we put
this problem together, the effects have cascaded back from the burner
tip, to the local distribution company, to the pipeline, to the producer
and the mineral owner. Let's examine the facts of our problem briefly.
HYPOTHETICAL PROBLEM
Facts
Oil and Gas Lease
In July 1977, Big Oil Company ("BO") took an oil and gas lease from
Charles Landowner. The lease had a three-year primary term and covered
1288 acres. In April 1979, BO assigned 50 percent of its interest in the
lease to Little Oil Super Exploration Resources ("LOSER"). The two
producers entered into a joint operating agreement and drilled and completed two gas wells to two different formations on the premises, one
in May 1980 and one in July 1981. The Landowner No. 1 well qualified
as a high cost well under Section 107(c)(1) of the Natural Gas Policy
Act ("NGPA") and as such was not subject to price regulation. The Landowner No. 2 well qualified as a NGPA Section 102(c) well for which
there is a stated maximum lawful price through December 31, 1984, but
which is price deregulated thereafter.
Producer-PipelineSales Contract
In July 1980, BO negotiated a gas contract to sell its share of the gas
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produced from the Landowner No. I well to the Great Northern Pipeline
Co. ("Great Northern"), an interstate pipeline which was then paying
premium prices to attract commitment of new reserves. To induce BO
to commit the Landowner No. 1 Well, the contract provided for a price
of $8.00 per MMBtu and required Great Northern to take or pay for
gas at a minimum rate of 80% of the well's deliverability (but did not
include a make-up provision). At about the same time, Great Northern
contracted to buy approximately 15% of its estimated future needs from
a Canadian producer at $4.40 per MMBtu with annual escalations to
that rate. After the Landowner No. 2 well was completed, BO and Great
Northern entered into a second contract providing for the sale of gas
from that well at the maximum lawful price authorized by the NGPA
and, after deregulation, at a price fixed at 110% of the price of No.
2 fuel oil in New York harbor. This contract included an 80% take-orpay clause, but it also "provided for a five-year make-up period, and
contained a "regulatory-out" clause and a market-out clause.
Pipeline-Distributor Sales Contract
Great Northern sells its gas to two distribution companies: Columbus Gas Distribution Co. ("Columbustwhich serves residential, commercial and industrial customers at retail in Ohio) and Acme Gas
Distribution Co. ("Acmewhich serves similar types of customers in New
York). Columbus has traditionally purchased all of its gas from Great
Northern and has no existing interconnections with any other pipeline.
Acme, however, also buys gas from the Northeastern Pipeline Company
("Northeastern") with its contract demands being the same for its two
pipeline suppliers. Columbus has traditionally purchased gas from Great
Northern at a 90% load factor, or higher. Acme, on the other hand,
has swung back and forth, between the two pipeline suppliers depending on the relative cost of their gas, with the average load factor of takes
from Great Northern ranging from 75 to 90%. Great Northern's tariff
includes a 75% minimum commodity bill that requires local distribution companies to pay Great Northern for a minimum amount of gas
each month even if they do not purchase and distribute that amount.
Fuel Switching
The industrial customers of Columbus have been severely affected
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by the recession, and some have switched to the use of residual fuel oil
because the price of oil has fallen relative to the price of gas. As a result,
there has been a reduction of 35% in Columbus' annual requirements.
Columbus has reduced its takes from Great Northern by an equivalent
amount, since Great Northern's weighted average cost of gas has soared.
Such cut-backs have led Great Northern to shut-in the Landowner No.
I well and to reduce its takes from the Landowner No. 2 well to a level
of 70% deliverability. Acme's loss in total sales has been less severe
because of its purchases from Northeastern, whose gas costs are approximately 30 cents per MMBtu less than those of Great Northern.
However, Acme has been able to maintain its industrial sales only by
reducing the takes from Great Northern to minimum bill levels.
Potential Points of Conflict
Local Distribution Companies vs. Pipeline Companies
Because of the financial pressures of the recession and fuel switching,
Columbus has recently notified Great Northern that it cannot continue
to pay the minimum bill amounts. Columbus has filed with the Federal
Regulatory Agency to waive the minimum bill provision in Great
Northern's Thriff as it applies to customers without alternative sources
of supply. Acme has intervened requesting that the minimum bill provision be eliminated as to all customers.
In a related development, Great Northern has sought to preserve and
recover industrial consumers who have the alternative fuel capacities
by asking the Federal Regulatory Agency to approve a special marketing
plan ("SMP"). Under the proposed SMP, Great Northern would offer
gas at discount rates to industrial end-users with alternative fuel
capacities. The additional gas supplies would be purchased at discounted
prices from producers from whom Great Northern has not taken its full
take-or-pay volumes who are willing to accept gas contract amendments
reducing Great Northern's future take-or-pay obligations. Great Northern expects that the special marketing plan will permit it to compete
effectively with residual fuel oils, as well as mitigate its take-or-pay
obligations. However, competing pipelines and end-users who would not
be eligible under Great Northern's SMP proposal claim it is
discriminatory and will cause them financial damage.
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Conflicts Between Pipeline Companies and Producers
Currently BO contends that Great Northern owes it $1,000,000 in takeor-pay payments on the Landowner No. I well. Great Northern denies
this allegation contending that its performance is excused wholly or in
part because:
a. The "take-or-pay payment provided for in the contract would
result in BO recovering more than the maximum price permitted
under the NGPA for the Landowner No. 2 well;
b. Market conditions in the gas industry are a force majeure event
that excuses Great Northern's performance;
c. The state conservation agency has prorationed production from
the lease to 50 percent of delivery capacity, relieving Great
Northern from taking or paying for more than that percentage,
since its obligation arises only if gas is "available" for sale.
Great Northern is honoring its take-or-pay obligation on the Landowner No. 2 well, after having redetermined the price in July 1984 under
the contract's market-out clause to $3.10 per MMBtu (the maximum
lawful price was then $3.73). However, BO has complained to the Federal
Regulatory Agency that the price redetermination was discriminatory
because Great Northern failed to invoke the clause against its producersubsidiary at the same time.
LOSER has been unable to find a market for its share of the gas produced, but it has been required to pay its share of operating costs under
its operating agreement with BO. LOSER has asked the state conservation commission either to order Great Northern to buy its share of gas
or to order BO to share its revenues with LOSER. There is also legislation pending in the state legislature that would require revenue sharing
between BO and LOSER. Naturally, Great Northern and BO are resisting
LDSER's requests, arguing that either order would be unconstitutional
under the Supremacy Clause or Commerce Clause.
Related ProducerConcerns
The lease with Charles Landowner contains a shut-in royalty clause
that permits the lease to be held without actual production if a shut-in
royalty is timely paid. The Landowner No. I well was shut in on April
1, 1982, and shut-in payments were made March 1, 1983, and March
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4, 1984. Both BO and LOSER are concerned with the status of the lease.
As a result, BO is seriously considering a proposal from Great Northern to take gas from the Landowner No. I well for its SMP if BO
will agree to a price of $2.40 per MMBtu and reduce the take-or-pay
percentage to 50 percent. Charles Landowner has just given notice to
BO that he claims the royalty share of take-or-pay payments received
by BO on the Landowner No. 2 well and that he is opposed to any
downward negotiation in the contract price on the Landowner No. I
well. Landowner has also notified LOSER that he considers that it is
in violation of its implied obligation to market within a reasonable time.
Contract Clause Definitions
1. Take-or-Pay Clause
A take-or-pay clause provides that a purchaser must pay for a
minimum amount of gas made available by a producer based upon a
percent of delivery capacity of the well whether the purchaser actually
takes the gas or not. This clause guarantees to the producer a minimum
cash flow from the well. For this hypothetical a simplified take-or-pay
is as follows:
"Beginning with the date of first delivery, and subject
to the terms and provisions of this agreement, in addition to the actual take of casinghead gas and flash gas,
Seller agrees to sell and deliver to Buyer, and Buyer
agrees to take and pay for or pay for if available and
not taken, during each year an average daily contract
minimum quantity of gas well gas equal to eighty percent (80%) of Seller's pro rata share of the delivery
capacity of the well(s) covered hereby."
2. Take-or-Pay Make-up Clause
A make-up clause is a portion of some take-or-pay clauses which permits the purchaser to credit take-or-pay payments toward additional purchases of gas above minimum take levels. The purchaser need only pay
the difference between the price applicable when the gas was first made
available and paid for but not taken and when the gas was actually taken.
The following simplified make-up clause is applicable to Landowner
No. 2 well:
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"If during any one year Buyer fails to take the total
contract minimum quantity of gas which it is required
to take and pay for or pay for if not taken during said
year. Buyer shall have the right during the next 5 years
of the remaining term of this agreement, whichever is
less, to receive a quantity of gas well gas which is in excess of minimum take requirements and is equal to the
quantity paid for but not received during the applicable
year; provided, however, that Buyer shall pay any increase in price between that upon which payments were
made and that applicable at the time of taking."
3. Regulatory-Out Clause
A regulatory-out clause recognizes regulatory control over the resale
of gas and shifts the risks to the producers of the Federal Regulatory
Agency disallowing recovery by the pipeline-purchaser of amounts paid
to the producer-supplier.
"Notwithstanding any other provisions in this agreement, the price to be paid for any gas delivered or for
which payment is due hereunder including tax reimbursement, shall never exceed any of the following
pnces:
(a) The price Buyer is permitted to include and retain
in its rates by the Federal Regulatory Agency or other
authority having jurisdiction over Buyer's rates. If Buyer
is precluded by any governmental authority from including and retaining in its rates all or any portion of
the price otherwise payable to Seller hereunder, Buyer
shall notify Seller in writing of the price Buyer can retain in its rates."
4. Market-Out Clause
A market-out clause enables the Buyer to refuse to take gas at the
contract price, regardless of other contract terms, if the Buyer determines that the price is above market levels. The unilateral right of the
Buyer is balanced (in many contracts, as in this hypothetical) with the
right by the Seller to elect to terminate sales to the Buyer and to require
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the Buyer to exercise reasonable efforts to transport the gas on behalf
of Seller to a new market.
"Notwithstanding any other provision in this agreement, the price to be paid for any gas delivered or for
which payment is due hereunder including tax reimbursement, shall never exceed any of the following
prices:

(b) A price which, in Buyer's sole opinion, will render
the gas uneconomic to Buyer or its customers. At any
time hereunder, Buyer may notify Seller in writing of
such determination and of the price Buyer is willing to
pay Seller for gas. The price contained in Buyer's notice
shall be effective on the date specified in such notification. Seller shall have up to but not more than thirty
(30) days to notify Buyer in writing whether it elects to
continue sales hereunder at the price contained in
Buyer's notice or to request the release of all gas subject
to this agreement. Should Seller fail to give written
notice of its election to have the gas released within such
thirty (30) day period, Seller shall be deemed to have
elected to continue sales hereunder at the price
contained in Buyer's notice. If Seller elects to have the
gas released from this contract, Buyer shall use best efforts to transport the gas on behalf of Seller for
redelivery at a mutually agreeable point on Buyer's
system. Seller's right to request the release of the gas is
conditioned upon Seller's ability to sell the gas at a
price higher than that contained in Buyer's notice. Such
release shall be effective at the expiration of said thirty
(30) day period, subject only to receipt by Buyer of
Seller's request, accompanied by evidence that such
other purchaser is willing to pay a higher price. Seller
shall have no obligation to refund any of the price
received for its gas prior to the release of such gas from
the agreement."
58

5. Minimum Bill Clause
A minimum bill clause in a pipeline sales tariff is an obligation applicable to the purchaser to pay a minimum amount whether or not
gas is purchased. This clause in a contract between the pipeline and its
purchaser is analogous to a take-or-pay clause in a contract between
a producer and its pipeline-purchaser.
"The minimum monthly bill shall be the sum of the
demand charge, plus a sum equal to the commodity
charge multiplied by 75% of the contract quantity,
multiplied by the number of days in the billing month,
plus the amount applicable under the Purchased Gas
Adjustment Clause."
6. Shut-In Royalty Clause
A shut-in royalty clause insures that after a stated period the landowner either will receive a royalty payment based upon sales from a
producing lease or will receive a royalty payment to maintain the lease
even though there is no gas production.
"While there is a gas well on this Lease, or on acreage
pooled therewith, but gas from such well is not being
sold or used, Lessee shall pay or tender annually at the
end of each period during which such gas is not sold or
used, as royalty, an amount equal to the delay rental
provided for... and while said royalty is so paid or
tendered this Lease shall be held as a producing Lease
under the habendum clause hereof"
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Summary and Analysis
As is indicated in the problem, because Columbus and Acme, the local
distribution companies, do not need as much gas as they are obligated
to pay for under the minimum bill provision of Great Northern's tariff
(which obligates those local distribution companies to pay for a certain
minimum amount of gas even if their customers do not need it) they
are seeking to modify the minimum bill provisions of the Great Northern tariff. This threatens Great Northern.
Because Great Northern is adversely affected by the falloff in demand,
it is seeking to boost its sales by what is called a special marketing program, which would offer gas at discounted rates to consumers who might
otherwise switch to alternate fuels.
This special marketing program is opposed, however, by other
pipelines who fear the competition, perhaps, and by end users who will
not qualify for the special rates.
Great Northern also finds itself in a dispute with Big Oil Company
(BO), one of the producers in our problem, over its take-or-pay
obligation.
In 1980 and 1981, under the facts of our problem, BO negotiated two
very favorable contracts with Great Northern Pipeline. Great Northern
wanted the gas committed by BO at that point in time because it thought
it needed to increase the amount of reserves that it had committed.
Although the prices that were agreed to were higher than the cost of
gas then in the Great Northern pipeline, the total quantity of the highpriced gas was small in comparison to that of the low-priced gas that
was already in the pipeline, and therefore, the impact on Great Northern's consumers was relatively small. Thus, nobody paid much attention to these high-priced contracts that were entered into in 1980 and
1981.
Those 1980 and 1981 contracts also provided very favorable take-orpay provisions for the producer. The take-or-pay provision was included to provide cash flow for the producer. In the event that the pipeline
did not need to take the gas, it nonetheless was obligated to pay for
a minimum amount, a minimum percentage of BO's delivery capacity
from the wells. In this case, the percentage was set at 80 percent. One
sees contracts with up to 90 percent or even higher take-or-pay obligations. There is a lot of money at stake here. In our problem, we are talking about a million dollar issue, but it has been estimated that the total
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take-or-pay liability of pipelines in the United States is in the vicinity
of $8 billion. So we've got something to argue about.
Big Oil has its problems enforcing its take-or-pay contract. However,
Little Oil Super Exploration Resources (or Loser) has it even worse.
Loser's situation is that it cannot find a market for its share of the
natural gas produced from these wells, but under its operating agreement with BO, it has an obligation to pay its share of operating expenses.
Thus, Loser has the worse of both worlds here: no income, but an obligation to pay its share of expenses.
It should surprise no one that Loser has sought relief both administratively and in the State Legislature.
Finally, the decline in the gas market has given both BO and Loser
problems with their lessee. Because of the problems encountered by BO
and Loser, Charles Landowner is questioning the validity of the oil and
gas lease. The problem here is that the courts have said that the lessee
under an oil and gas lease may not hold that lease indefinitely by payment of a shut-in royalty. The courts have said that the lessee has an
implied obligation, an implied covenant, to market gas within a
reasonable period of time and at the best available price. Loser is at
risk here because Charles Landowner contends that Loser, which has
been unable to find a market, has failed to market the gas within a
reasonable period of time. If Landowner prevails, the lease will terminate.
Big Oil Company is also at risk, however, in several respects. First of
all, Landowner demands a share of the take-or-pay payments if and
when they are made to Big Oil Company. In addition, there is a potential threat here of a claim against BO for a failure to market within a
reasonable time, with respect to the gas that is shut-in.
On the other hand, if Big Oil Company seeks to avoid that threat,
either by renegotiating its gas contracts to a lower price or participating
in a special marketing program, there is a possibility that Landowner
will contend that Big Oil Company has breached its implied covenant
to market at the best available price. So it is a sort of "damned if you
do and damned if you don't" situation.
I think you can see from this brief summary of the facts that the problem has been constructed so that the parts are interconnected. There
is a cascade effect caused by the decline in demand at the burner tip.
The problem has also been constructed (we hope) so that it is somewhat
amusing. Let me note, however, that the problems which are depicted
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in this problem are not hypothetical. They're very real problems, and
nobody who is involved with those problems is very amused by them.
PANEL AND PROCEDURE
I think we're ready now to turn to our panel of experts. Let me just
say a word about the procedure. Basically, what we're going to do is
use a modified debate or panel discussion form. We will begin by a
15-minute presentation by a speaker expressing the views of a local
distribution company commenting upon the kinds of problems presented
by our fact situation. There will then be a response from a representative of a pipeline company. There will then be a rebuttal period, and
then we will open the floor to discussion from the other members of
the panel. Finally, we will open the floor for discussion and questions
from the audience.
With that background, let me introduce to you our first speaker,
Richard Solomon. Mr. Solomon has had a distinguished career both
in government service and in private practice. He is going to talk to us
about the distribution company's viewpoint on the problems presented
by this fact situation. Dick, take it away, please.
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